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January 29, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 8527 
THE "PUEBLO" AFFAIR 
Ml". MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ap-
plaud the position of President Johnson, 
who recognizes that there are no simple 
ways out of the grave crisis which has 
dC\ eloped in the wake of the Pueblo af-
fair. By taking the matt.er to the United 
Nations forthwith, the President has 
done what he can do, at this point, to 
set in motion m achinery for what is to 
be hoped can be a satisfactory solution. 
In the meantime, however, the sub-
stance of om national int.erest ought n ot 
to be lost sight of in hot pursuit of its 
shadow. The problem of safeguarding the 
interests of this Nation, and in a very 
real sense, the wor d's interests is to see 
to it that the 83 Americans-which I now 
learn is the accun.te number-are re-
turned alive, I repeat, the word is "alive," 
and that there is tvoided, at the same 
time, another bloodbath in the model of 
Vietnam which, in Korea, could so 
much more readily become world war 
m. 
Whatever it takes to bring about that 
result in full-not half of it but all of 
it-is to be welcomed. It may be helpful 
to bear in mind in this connection that 
the responses in t he Barbary Wars, a 
century and a half away, are not neces-
sarily the answers for a time and place 
when nuclear Wltl" s only seconds away. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have p1;nted in the RECORD at 
t his point statements I made over the 
weekend relative to my perspective on 
the Pueblo seizme; also, ectitorials from 
the Christian Science Monitor. the Wall 
Street Journal, and the Baltimore Sun, 
having to do with that affail". 
TI1ere being no objection, the items 
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD, 
DEMOCRAT, OF MONTANA 
PERSPECTIVE oN THE .. PUEBLo•• 
On Friday last, I made the following state-
ment: 
"I a.m glad that the matter of the U.S.S. 
Pueblo seizure Is being taken up by the 
U .N. Security Council. One war is not only 
enough for the world; it Is too much. I am 
glad that t:,!s organlzat!.on-represcntlng 
the world-Is facing up to its respons!bll!ty 
in th!s matter because it 1s a most immediate 
and pressing danger. 
"The last thing we need is another land 
war in As!a. If we want t o save the lives of 
the 83 we had bjltter move clrcumspectly-as 
we are--with patience--as we are--because 
th!s Is a time of testing. A rash action could 
well seal their doom. I want to see these 
men sa,·ed-not d estroyed." 
Those who would advise rash, Immediate 
and prcclpltant action against North Korea 
should remJnd themselves of what happened 
during the Korean War. When American 
forces, having won a great victory by the 
Inchon Jandlng, then advanced across the 
38th para.llel to the Yn.lu River, the <l!vid!ng 
line between Nortb Korea and China, a figure 
close to one m1111on Chinese entered North 
K orea. The result was a <l!rect and bloody 
con!rontMion, a new war wh!ch prolongc<l 
the conflict and produced tens of thousands 
of a<ld!tlonal American casualties. 
In the end, the Korean War terminated 
!n a stalemate at the 38th parallel. What ho.s 
£>xlstf'd Rlnre has not been" peace settlement. 
but an ..1neasy truce arrangement. I would 
also po!at out that since that t!me North 
Korea has entered Into mutual security 
treaties with both Oh!na and the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, any rash action would not 
only, !n all likelihood, seal the doom of the 
83 Americans or the USS Pueblo, !t c:>Uld 
also br!ng about another bloody and pro-
longed Involvement !n Korea and, per' >aps, 
even a direct con!roatatlon between this 
country on the one hand and Oh!na and 
the Soviet Un!on on the other. 
It !s well to remember the matter of geog-
raphy wh!ch 1s not at the moment a factor 
!n V!et Nam where North V!et Nam and 
Laos l!e between China and ourselves and 
where Russia !s thousands o! miles away to 
the north where !t borders China. At North 
Korea, Russia !s right there as Is Oh!na. If 
we would save these 83 Americans-and that 
Is the most urgent and Important considera-
tion-we would do well to ponder these pos-
slb111t!es and to continue to move, as the 
President !s doing, w!th caution, coolness, 
and restraint. 
The situation !n V!et Nam !s difficult and 
dangerous. The s!tuat!on developing in North 
Korea !s da.ngerous and difficult and far 
more del!cate. 
[From the Christian Science Monitor, 
Jan. 29, 1968 J 
C'PERDJCABIS ALIVE'' 
(By Erwin D. Canham) 
We are no longer in the era o! gunboat 
d!ploma•y. 
The terms of power have changed. T!me 
was wh"n a great nation IH<e the United 
States could have sent a small force of 
marines !n to Wonsan Harbor and tld!ed up 
t he matter o! the Pueblo !n short order. But 
today, behind every exercise of power by 
great nations l!ke the United States or the 
Soviet Union, lies the specter of the thermo-
nuclear cloud. ~t Is a mighty deterrent. 
Small nations like North Korea, with m!n!-
mal physical power, are thus able to act w!th 
impunity as they have hardly ever been able 
to act !n the history o! the modern world. 
The r ole of the great nation Is Infinitely 
ditllcult and dangerous. It !s basically in-
hibited. 
These are considerations to keep !n m!nd 
when !t Is decided to station surve!llance 
ships l!ke the Pueblo of! host!le coaats. There 
isn't much you can do about it when they 
get Into trouble. 
HIJACKING PERIL 
Certainly American public opinion, and 
possibly ol!lc!al Judgment as well, has not 
caught up w!th the changed terms or power. 
Possibly the Defense Department authorities 
should have thought long and hard before 
they placed craft like the Pueblo a few mUes 
off North Korea, or deep In the Tonkin Gul!, 
o r !n other such exposed places. The dangers 
of h!jack!ng are real and present. 
Few of us know how valuable the use or 
spy ships really !s. Perhaps the operation !s 
or the essence. Perhaps It !s of peripheral Im-
portance. The risk !s certainly very great. It !s 
to be hoped that the returns £tre comparable. 
Presumably many of the Russian trawlers 
which hover dll!gently of! Cape Cod, and 
other parts of the United States coast, both 
At.lantlc and Pacific. have an espionage mis-
sion n.long wt!h thc!r teke of fish . But rarely 
have they pressed the 12-m!le i!m!t or any-
thing l!ke !t. Wh1•n they come closer In, they 
get permission. Hea l!stlcally, of course, one 
must assume that submarines are gathering 
data anywhere thPre !s deep enough water. 
DANGEROt~S UNCERTAINTY 
There !s a lot to be said for the value of 
aU this spying. President Eisenhower's open-
hklcs proposal at ( iPneva w·"' hased on t.he 
wise aBIIumptlon that the more each grea o 
nation knows about the observable military 
disposition of the other the safer !t w!ll be. 
For the United States to see any unusun.l 
troop movements--or thelr absence--in East-
ern Europe Is Important. Uncertainly breeds 
fear. The Information now gathered by the 
reconnaissance satellites may well be a fac-
tor for peace. 
For the Soviets to know something of the 
United States ca.pactty for instant retal!atlon 
!n the event of a nuclear attack, and vice 
versa, helps preserve the over-all peace. And 
perhaps slm!lar Information about the dts-
poslt!on of the North Korean forces--at a 
t!me when assassins and saboteurs were In-
vading the South Korean ca.p!tal-would be 
helpful to eva.luate the scn.lc or the crisis. 
RELATIVE IMPUNITY 
But all this information does not provide 
the United States w!th the means o! Invad-
Ing Wonsan and recapturing the Pueblo. In-
deed, as Amer!ca.n publ!c opinion vividly re-
flects, the United States !s having trouble 
enough coping w!th !ts m.!l!tary problems !n 
VIetnam. 
For this reason, !t would seem that most 
Americans are not demanding the kind of 
action wh!ch an American President would 
have asserted freely in the good old days. 
"Perd!car!s al!ve or Ra!sull dead" !s now an 
empty and unreal!stlc threat. 
The age of the small nation Is here. And 
wh!le th!s relative immunity from big-nation 
force has !ts embarrassments for the United 
States now, this Is the kind of world !n which 
the Unlted States bel!eves. If great war has 
become too dangerous, too suicidal, !or the 
human race, and U lesser wars have each 
their share of Insupportable risk, then the 
world has come Into a n~w period. 
There are c!rcumstsnces In which force 
Is used, as !n VIetnam and !n Korea 18 years 
ago. Or In the Middle Ea&t last summer. But 
a great power has to be very prudent as It 
embarks upon the use of force. 
It !s a strange new world !n which we l!ve, 
but desp! te present chagrins 1 t has stirring 
poss!bili t!es. 
{From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 1968] 
THE MOMENTUM OF BELLIGERENCE 
Faced with a possible replay or the Korean 
war wh!le bogged down !n VIetnam, the Ad-
ministration can hardly be faulted for order-
Ing a limited call-up or a!r reservists. Yet the 
danger Is great that both sides could progres-
sively harden their "responses" untll the 
second Korean war would become a certainty. 
No one pretends to know whether North 
Korea's capture or the Intelligence sh!p 
Pueblo signals an Intent to open a seoonc1 
front. Many doubt !t, seeing in the Incident 
Instead an attempt to exploit &n Inviting op-
portunity-the vulnerabU!ty of a lonely, 
l!ghtly armed ve86el jammed w!th sophisti-
cated electronic gear. 
The harsh fact nonetheless remains that 
the North Koreans are eminently capable of 
re-starting that war, wh!ch has been a most 
uneasy state of suspension these 15 years, ty-
Ing down 50,000 U.S. troops. It's not only 
North Korea.; the Communists can open sec-
ond fronts in Laos and Thn.lland &nd else-
where along the vast periphery of the Red 
world. 
A further !act !s that right now may seem 
an attractive time !or the North Koreans 
(or others) to do so. Along w! th all 1 ts other 
woes !n VIetnam, the U.S. !s confronted W!th 
what may be the biggest battle of the war 
at Khe Sanh below the demJI!tarl.zed zone: 
There, 5,000 Marines are tightly encircled by 
North VIetnamese and VIetcong forces, and 
the American position !ti perilous. 
To some. Indeed , Khe Sanh looks l!ke an-
other Dter:ble,:>~hu. To U6 !t appenrs rather 
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unlll<ely, tne u .b. strength In VIetnam oemg 
so much greater than was the French In 1954. 
At best, though Khe Sanh Is a bitter reminder 
how much power the Communists can still 
mount alter nil the punishment they have 
taken from the U.S. And It could well Impress 
the North Koreans as a good time for major 
troublc-m.nklng precisely for that renson. 
For still a further unplensant fact, the 
US. Is In fairly poor shape to wngc a new 
Korean war, let alone any others. As our 
W::u;hlngton Bureau puts It, the call-up of 
reservist.~ Ptnphnslzc.s that very point: for 
nil Its enormous power, the VIetnam wnr has 
spread the power thin and the nation Is short 
of men nnd materiel for any sustained 
struggle with North Korea. Which adds one 
more chapter to the long lesson about the 
dangers or p;ettlng mllltarlly overextended 
and overcommitted around tho world. 
Suppose, however, that the North Koreans 
have no such Intentions, that the Pueblo's 
capt=e wns an Isolated foray It Is still a 
tread erous sttul\tlon, ~a use It is one In 
which each side's successiVe steps could 
carry things out of hand, North Korea could 
react to the call-up by more mllltary moves; 
the US. could then react with tougher steps 
or too own. In no time the fat could be In 
the tile 
Caution thus Is mandatory So far we 
think the Adralnlst.ratlon probably has been 
reasonably rcstralmd Certainly It could not 
just sit there. saying and doing nothing 
wlll'e the North Koreans koct> the ship and 
crew. Wa.•hlngt..on titercfor< Is trying to .ex-
haust dlplomatlc means taking the Issue 
to the UN Se<:urlty Council, tor ex:unple-
before re£Ort to force Fortunately, this np-
proach &EetnS J..o hR\C the pprOHII O! ntOSl 
members of Congr 
There 1s finally, one speclllc reason why 
the Korean confrontation &hould not be al-
lowed to e6Cala te, \\1lly-n!lly, Into war. It 
"'ould be wholly d proportion te J..o the 
ostensible callS<', name:y the Pueblo and the 
nature or Its mission. 
Rt"mentl><'r he U 2" II the US Govern-
ment Cf>nslders It necessary, nnd It doubt-
less is In th~ world as It Is. to send a lone 
recorllla.l.ssance plane high ovf.>r Russia, It 
must. renl! ,.. the rtsk and be prep:l.l'ed to 
lose the plane The U.S. never reg rded Its 
shooting down by the Soviets aa a cause o! 
war 
Exactly the same wltll the Pueblo. ll.fany 
question.< :.re unans wered n.bOut the h lm-
clllng of I predicament. and the seizure 
ltsPIC Is humiliating and ln!uriMing. Still, 
If the US viPws that kind or ml ton 1\8 
es.s•ntlal. It should be prepared to accept 
what can h pt>en "1thout OH~r-n:actlng to 
the poln t o r r1sk.ing actual war 
Granted. If the North K 01 ns do a1m to 
re op n the war, the6e ob6erva.tlons are 
acadtmlc But for w,ll' to c(lllle without ap-
propriate oe.use, merely through the mo-
mentwn of mutual belllgerence could be ""' 
tragic as th ooasequences or the shot at 
Sarajevo. 
[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Jan 28, 
1968) 
DECaU OJ' ClliSIS 
For thoroughly good reMons, the Admin-
Istration In Washington Ia doing Its utmost 
to find a pe.<ecful solution to the problem of 
the vessel Pueblo and Its crew. One r<·as<m 
Is that the alternative Is mlllUiry nc tlon of 
unpre<llrtnble eventual dimensions, however 
llmlted It might br "t !Irs , and with our 
ma.slve commitment In Vletnnm we could 
not easily underta ke another I .rge war In 
Koren 
In Korel\ we nrc militarily thin, wlt.h son'e 
60.000 tl'lw>ps. unwng them two divisions not 
<'tmslttf'rt"d nnnhAt-rf'ady Be!itdes thot , nhC>nt 
47.000 South K<>r~nn troop•, pr~•\tmllbly th" 
best, are tJed down alongside \18 In VIetnam. 
Apart frorr. questions o! air and sea strengths 
and of m~terlel, those figures on ground 
troops give the picture. And the VIetnam 
war Is &O vora.clo\18 In Its requlrements that 
we could not supply swift reinforcement In 
Korea. 
Also grim to contemplate Is the effect In-
volvement In another large con.ftlct would 
have domestically. The cancellations o! In-
ternal urgencies, the econornlc disruptions, 
the Impositions of controls, the mounting 
taxes, come all too readily to the Imagina-
tion, 
Then there Is the fact that, as the Admin-
Is tration l<nows, this Is not Inherently a 
maJor crisis. It could grow Into one, but In 
Its nature It Is not. It Is an incident; a 
serious one. but an Incident. 
One simple way o! judging Its Inherent 
gravity Is to note the comparative degrees 
of concern with which the public followed 
the proceedings o! the Unl ted Nations be-
fore and during the Arab-Israel war last 
June, and follows them now. At that time 
the !acts and the Issues were stark and plain, 
o.s were the dangers, Including the danger 
of a direct Arnerlca.n-Russlnn confrontation. 
Dangers of that magnitude exist today 
only 1! permitted to develop from a state of 
general confusion The North Koreans could 
encourage a heigh tenlng or danger by re-
fusing f\ntly to release the men or the 
Pueblo. or by placing them on trial Others, 
too by lnt t·nt o r error, could contribute 
'I he Administration shows a determina-
tion , while prep:u-lng for contingencies, to 
m11ke every effort to obtain the releo.se of 
the men without using military !orce-cvery 
effort, that Is, n o t to let events take charge 
and begin to swt>ep ahea.d wth n mom en tum 
of ther own, beyond control. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
have listened with a great deal o! inter-
est to the remarks of the distinguished 
minority leader. I can understand his 
great concern about the situation which 
has developed Incident to the seizure of 
the U.S.S. Pueblo and the Imprisonment 
of its crew. 
There Is no question in my mind-
none whatsoever-that the ship was Il-
legally seized outside U1e 12-mile llmlt, 
which Is the limit set by the North Ko-
rean Government Itself. But I think the 
Pre !dent Is operating on the right wave-
length , and In his capacity as the Presi-
dent of the United Stales and Com-
mander In Chlef Is using every avallable 
means at his diplomatic disposal to see If 
It Is at all possible to bring about the 
return of the 83 men, including the two 
ctvllians, which comprl~>e the crew of the 
U S .S. Pueblo. 
What I am lntrrested ln. Mr. Presi-
dent, Is the return of those 83 men alive--
alive-and I think that Is something we 
ought to keep In mind at all times be-
cause It would do no good to go in and 
sny, "sink the Pueblo," or "bomb a city," 
as has been suggested, and In that man-
ner seal the doom of the 83 men who 
were there, not by choice but under or-
ders. We must see wltat we can do to 
save them. 
Mr. President. that I think, Is the 
paramount fact.or In tills whole affair at 
this time. I am quite cL•r!aln U1at the dls-
tlnr,Utslwd mil •rity lr.tder would agree 
w1lh me In tln i resprcl 
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